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CHINA AS A NORMATIVE FOREIGN POLICY ACTOR 
BRANTLY WOMACK
* 
1. Introduction 
China has been defined variously as Westphalian, realist, and as a subverter of the unity of 
Western normative action, in places such as Sudan and Myanmar. If the topic of this working 
paper were how China affects Western and especially American policy initiatives, then these 
would be familiar depictions. However, if we allow for the possibility that ‘our’ norms are not 
the only possible norms, and perhaps not the only valid ones, then the distance between China’s 
behaviour and that of the West may not be a measure of China’s moral defects, but rather of the 
distinctiveness of China’s perspective in its external relationships. Understanding China on its 
own terms as an intentional actor should be a prerequisite to understanding China as a 
normative foreign policy actor. China is certainly worth the effort. Its long history as a resilient 
traditional empire, its collapse and transformation in the twentieth century, its revolutionary 
policies during the Cultural Revolution, and the current era of reform and openness, all have 
essential moral dimensions to be explored.  
Besides the intrinsic interest in China as a normative foreign policy actor, analysing China 
requires a broadening of the spectrum of possible normative approaches, and suggesting several 
fundamental principles of normative international action that are sometimes neglected in the 
West. China was one of the many countries that were at the wrong end of the mission 
civilizatrice; unwillingly, it helped carry the white man’s burden. China’s radical norms were 
therefore based on the critical rejection of imperialism and the presumed right of intrusion into 
weaker political communities. Even today, many of the normative differences between China 
and the West stem from the kto-kovo [who-to whom] differences in the experience of 
imperialism.  
Beyond the critique of Western intrusiveness, analysing China can add new depth to a study of 
normative international action. The Western focus tends to be on the actor and its moral motive. 
Both traditionally and at present, the Chinese focus is instead on relationships and the ethics of 
relationships. A relational perspective can highlight the role of power in asymmetric 
relationships. It also stresses respect for the other as the cardinal virtue of normative relations. 
The consideration of norms and their effects should involve more than an assessment of one’s 
actions and their consequences for one’s own conscience, but take into consideration the effects 
on others. In this respect, China as a thinking moral actor poses many stimulating and 
challenging questions concerning the interactive framework of normative action. 
This working paper consists of three major parts. The first considers the evolution of China as a 
normative foreign policy actor from the traditional Chinese empire to the present. The second 
presents case studies of Chinese foreign policy in the framework suggested by Nathalie Tocci, 
but according to China’s own norms. The last part reflects on the challenges and contributions 
that China can bring to a more general theory of normative foreign policy action. 
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2.  China’s Norms in Historical Context 
2.1  Norms and Chinese norms 
The English word ‘normative’ has an interesting family. A ‘norm’ can be a moral principle, but 
it can also be an expectation of non-deviance. A ‘normal curve’ or ‘normal distribution’ is the 
expected pattern of outcomes, and to be ‘normal’ is not to be abnormal. When in 1685 Jean-
Baptiste de la Salle founded the first teachers’ college, the Ecole Normale, the term ‘normal 
school’ was used because the mission was to standardise teacher training and education. The 
term ‘normative’ dates only from the nineteenth century, but its implication of applying a rule to 
behaviour hearkens back to its Latin ancestor, norma, a carpenter’s square. 
The Chinese translation of ‘normative’, biaozhun 标准, conveys only the sense of 
standardisation rather than a moral imperative. However, if we look at attitudes towards 
ethically-guided behaviour, the Chinese tradition is at least as rich as that of the West. With its 
basic premise that human nature is good, Confucianism presented a very sophisticated ethic of 
social interaction that emphasised leadership by example, teaching morality, and the duties 
associated with relational roles. When it became China’s orthodoxy in the Han dynasty (206 BC 
to 220 AD), Confucianism not only provided the moral code for the Empire’s external relations, 
but also the examination curriculum for recruiting the bureaucracy. By contrast, the Daoists 
criticised the moralism of the Confucians as unnatural: “The human heart is like a spring. The 
more you press it down, the higher it will leap.” The Daoist emphasis on the way of nature and 
non-activity was not suited to be a governing orthodoxy, but it remains a fundamental influence 
on personal values and on Chinese aesthetics. Another strand of classical thought, the Legalists 
(also called Realists – in Chinese fa jia 法家) were instead brutally unconcerned with morality. 
They recommended to the ruler to hold on to the “two handles” of reward and punishment, and 
to be “empty, still, and silent, and from your place of darkness observe the weaknesses of 
others.” 
As different as these three Chinese approaches to the ethics of state are, they have some traits in 
common and stand in contrast to Western norms. They are not based on the revealed commands 
of God, nor are their recommendations justified by transcendental rewards and punishments. 
There is no glorification of altruism or self-denial per se, even though they all require 
tremendous self-discipline. The cardinal virtue of Confucianism is humanity (ren  仁, the 
character is derived from two people together), not obedience, even to God or the ruler. The 
focus is neither on the universal nor on the individual, but rather on proper behaviour in 
relationships. ‘Proper behaviour’ in relationships refers to actions that in the long run will be 
successful. It is with regards to which actions will be successful – and indeed what success is – 
that Confucians, Daoists and Legalists differ in their advice. 
2.2  From empire to victim 
From the Han Dynasty to the fall of the last dynasty two thousand years later, an ‘imperial 
Confucianism’ evolved. In domestic politics, the empire was supposed to be a pyramid of virtue, 
recruited on the basis of Confucian merit and serving the emperor by the judicious management 
of relationships among those in their charge. A distinctively Confucian foreign policy emerged 
more slowly but by the Tang (618-907) and the Song (960-1279) dynasties, the major elements 
were clear and very much an extension of domestic principles. First, China was dominant in its 
international environment not because of conquest, but because of its virtue (de 德). Because 
humanity is good, even barbarians could appreciate the virtue of China and learn from it. CHINA AS A NORMATIVE FOREIGN POLICY ACTOR | 3 
Tribute missions were expressions of deference to virtue and usually left with gifts more 
valuable than those they brought.  
Generally China did not interfere in the domestic politics of its neighbouring states. However, it 
recognised and dealt with the hereditary rulers, and when they were challenged by domestic 
turmoil, China’s dilemma was precisely whether to support the recognised ruler or to shift 
recognition to the victorious usurpers. As this dilemma suggests, the emphasis on virtue created 
a vital role for hypocrisy in Chinese diplomacy. As Machiavelli might have said, the appearance 
of Chinese virtue was often more important than its reality. On the other side of the coin, for 
China’s smaller neighbours the show of deference while in Beijing was counterbalanced by the 
claim of absolute authority while at home. The implication that neighbouring states were 
inferior did not sit well with their kings, and therefore various ruses were used to preserve the 
conflicting images of absolute authority at home and deference to China in Beijing. The 
Vietnamese emperor, for instance, would designate his young son as the ‘official king’ in 
dealing with China, and once sent an impostor to receive the seals of office (Buu Lam, 1968). 
When China was defeated by Vietnam in 1427, it accepted Vietnam’s apology and recognised 
the new ruler when he sent a golden effigy of himself to be punished. The handling of tribute 
missions was done so that anything other than deference was hidden from the emperor. The 
British mission of Lord McCartney in 1793 was a prime example of deflection of a very 
different emissary from the established pattern of deference (Hevia, 1996). 
Ultimately, the contradiction between China’s presumptions of superiority and the West’s 
growing ambitions for power created a series of confrontations, from the Opium War in 1840 to 
the Boxer Uprising in 1900. China lost each one. Each time its capacity for further resistance 
was reduced, so was its capacity to maintain domestic order. Finally, the Qing Dynasty 
collapsed in 1911 and was replaced by a situation of total chaos (Tsou, 1986). Warlords fought 
each other in the countryside, foreigners governed the modern economy in the cities, and Japan 
was tempted to extend its empire. Humiliation was the defining theme of China’s first century 
of contact with imperialism (Cohen, 2003).  
After the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, domestic weakness and external 
vulnerability came to an end, but the formative influence of suffering as the victim of Western 
and Japanese power remained. Even in China these resentments of past wrongs and sensitivities 
to bullying are today criticised as a ‘victim mentality’ (Medeiros & Taylor Fravel, 2003). 
However, it should be remembered that a ‘victim mentality’ has its roots in the reality of being a 
victim, and it is no more pathological than its opposite, the ‘victor mentality’, with its rosy 
memories of past glory and callousness in presuming that might is right.
1 
2.3  Virtue and the new communist order, 1949-1970 
China’s victimhood provided the historical context for the diplomacy of the People’s Republic 
of China, but the attitude of ‘new China’ was one of confidence. There was confidence in the 
Communist Party of China, because it had led a rural revolution to overwhelming victory. There 
was confidence in the people, because the main strength of the revolution was the mobilisation 
of the masses. There was confidence in Marxism-Leninism, because in the version creatively 
applied by Mao Zedong to Chinese conditions, its ideological guidance had proven correct. The 
tremendous success of the revolution led to the expectation that further revolutions in world 
politics were possible. 
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China’s revolutionary foreign policy was based on unity with the socialist camp, solidarity with 
the third world, and opposition to the capitalist world. Despite the chequered history of the 
Soviet Union’s relations with the Communist Party of China before 1949, Mao was willing to 
become part of the Soviet camp because it appeared to represent the organised forces of world 
revolution. Solidarity with the third world was also a fundamental commitment, because Mao 
expected that the “vast zone of…capitalist, semi-colonial and colonial countries” in between the 
United States and the Soviet Union would be the battleground on which the people would 
determine the victory of revolution (Mao Zedong, 1967, p. 99). Opposition to the capitalist 
world was founded on Lenin’s application of class struggle to international relations. However, 
in concrete negotiations and in the conduct of relations, compromise was possible and peaceful 
relations were preferable. For example, the British were allowed to keep control of Hong Kong 
even though their presence was considered illegitimate. On the other hand however, given the 
choice between diplomatic relations with France and support for the Viet Minh, China chose Ho 
Chi Minh.
2  
The great events of Chinese foreign relations in the 1950s were the Korean War, the Geneva 
Conference of 1954, and the Bandung Conference of 1955. The Korean War confirmed the 
hostility between China and the US that persisted until Nixon’s visit in 1972. Nevertheless, it 
demonstrated that China was a credible military force and thus set the stage for the inclusion of 
China as a major player at the Geneva Conference. This was China’s debut on the global 
diplomatic stage, and Zhou Enlai was instrumental in securing the agreement of the Viet Minh 
to the Geneva Accords. The Asian-African Conference, better known as the Bandung 
Conference, was a different kind of success for China. In the run-up to the Conference, Zhou 
Enlai improved relations with India and Burma, co-formulated the “Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence” and then played an active part in the Conference itself.
3  
Unfortunately however, the Bandung Conference proved to be the high-water mark of Chinese 
diplomacy, as China soon entered the turbulent stream of leftism. China was certainly a 
‘normative foreign policy actor’ in the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1969, but it drew such 
a sharp distinction between the friends and enemies of world revolution that it alienated almost 
everyone. Its criticism of the Soviet Union as revisionist and then as social-imperialist caused 
alienation from all but Albania in the socialist camp. Even Vietnam, which was dependent on 
Chinese aid, was shocked by China’s strident tone. Third world countries that had been 
favourably impressed by China at Bandung drifted away. China’s shrill and self-righteous 
leftism in these years produced isolation rather than world revolution. On the positive side of 
revolutionary activism, the building of the TanZam Railway in Africa in 1970-1976, at a cost of 
$500 million, was a remarkable and successful example of revolutionary goodwill, and vital in 
breaking the economic stranglehold of apartheid-riven South Africa on its neighbours. 
2.4  Evolution of reform era norms 
While the reform era in domestic policy started with a bang in December 1978, the ideological 
evolution of Chinese foreign policy was more gradual and complex. By 1970, the Soviet threat 
and the failure of radical foreign policy induced Mao Zedong to adopt an approach that might 
                                                      
2 Diplomatic relations with France were not established until 1964, ten years after the fall of Dienbienphu. 
3  The 5 Principles (called Pancha Sila in India) are: 1. mutual respect for territorial integrity and 
sovereignty; 2. mutual non-aggression; 3. mutual non-interference in internal affairs; 4. equality and 
mutual benefit; 5. peaceful coexistence.  As Chinese textbooks on international relations observe, these 
principles are rooted in Western principles of international relations as well and may thus be considered 
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be called revolutionary pragmatism. On the one hand, there remained the hope of world 
revolution, while on the other hand this was acknowledged as not being imminent. Therefore 
Mao decided to establish relations with any state that would recognise the PRC instead of the 
Republic of China on Taiwan, and he began the rapprochement with the US that culminated in 
the Shanghai Communiqué of 1972. After taking over China’s seat at the UN Security Council 
in 1971, China was very cautious and decidedly un-revolutionary. Foreign trade began its rapid 
expansion in the 1970s, although it remained under tight state control. 
The two most dramatic policy changes at the beginning of the reform era in January 1979 were 
the normalisation of relations with the US and the adoption of a policy of peaceful reunification 
with Taiwan. Five years later, the Sino-British Joint Declaration on Hong Kong was signed on 
the basis of Deng Xiaoping’s ‘one country, two systems’ policy. Without belittling the 
significance of these events, it could be argued that the abandonment of state trading 
monopolies and the encouragement of foreign investment were even more important. In the 
1980s the economies of China and Hong Kong began to merge, setting the stage for more 
general economic globalisation in the 1990s.
4 Contact between China and the outside world was 
increasingly deregulated.  
Adaptation to international norms has been a major dimension of China’s diplomacy in the 
reform era. China sought international advice in designing its Patent Law in 1984, and then 
adapted the law to WTO standards in 2000. The Copyright Law was passed in 1990, and China 
acceded to the Berne Convention on international copyright protection in 1992. In the area of 
non-proliferation, China has been establishing export regulations for nuclear, biological, 
chemical, missile and conventional dangerous materials since 1987.
5 It issued a White paper on 
non-proliferation in December 2003, and became a member of the Nuclear Supplier’s Group in 
2004.
6  In conventional arms sales, China ranked ninth in 2006, behind Germany, France, 
Netherlands, Italy, UK and Spain.
7 Its arms sales had climbed to 8.7% of the world total in 1987, 
but have since declined to 2.1%. There is however a cultural ‘Doppler Effect’ in the 
international appreciation of China’s accommodation to international and Western norms. 
Movement towards what is habitual and familiar in the developed world is accepted as ‘natural’, 
while critical attention is focused on the remaining differences and on problems of 
implementation.  
Developments in foreign policy norms have occurred in four major areas since the 1990s. First, 
China’s policy of non-interference in domestic affairs – which was part of its original Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence – was applied more strictly. In contrast to China’s public 
criticism of Soviet revisionism in the 1960s, there was no official criticism of the much more 
dramatic abandonment of communism by Mongolia, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The 
lack of criticism and the continuity in diplomatic relations is especially noteworthy given the 
conservative lurch in China’s domestic politics after the Tiananmen incident, which occurred on 
the same day – 4 June 1989 – that Solidarity won the Polish elections. Similarly, after China 
decided to support UN efforts to install a unity government in Cambodia in 1990, it ceased to 
support the Khmer Rouge and did not try to influence the factional composition of the 
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5  A guide to China’s regulations in this area is available at the following Foreign Ministry site:   
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/jks/fksflfg/t141341.htm 
6 The White Paper is available at: http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20031202/index.htm 
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government. In recent years there have been subtle modifications of the policy of non-
interference, most notably behind-the-scenes pressures on Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea and Myanmar, but even in these cases the appearance of pressure is carefully avoided. 
Second, after the international uproar and isolation from developed countries resulting from the 
1989 Tiananmen crackdown, China began to pay more diplomatic attention to its Asian 
neighbours (Womack, 2003a). China normalised relations with Indonesia in 1990, Singapore, 
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in 1991, and South Korea in 1992. It established positive 
relationships with the new Central Asian republics created after the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
and developed an unexpectedly close rapport with Boris Yeltsin’s Russia. In the Asian financial 
crisis of 1997, China’s promise not to devalue its currency was not only deeply appreciated by 
its neighbours, but it also demonstrated an impressive degree of international financial 
autonomy. China’s success with its neighbours is somewhat counter-intuitive, considering that 
its rising power has increased the relative vulnerability of its neighbours. In an anarchic world, 
one would expect the neighbours to ally with one another and to weigh in against China. 
Third, and greatly facilitating Beijng’s good neighbourhood strategy, China has increased its 
involvement in multilateral institutions. From a global perspective, the most dramatic event was 
China’s entry into the WTO in December 2001, and this was indeed an important watershed. 
But even more important, creative and successful have been China’s involvements in regional 
multilateral arrangements with its neighbours. The best known and least successful of these has 
been the Six Party Talks on Korean nuclear weapons. Although the intransigence of both North 
Korea and the US has impeded progress in negotiations, China has established itself as the 
reliable mediator. China’s multilateral relations with Southeast Asia have developed rapidly in 
the last decade. It joined the ‘ASEAN plus three’ talks with Japan and South Korea in 1997, and 
then established a China ASEAN Free Trade Area in 2002. At the same time, China signed an 
agreement with ASEAN committing to a peaceful resolution of differences in the South China 
Sea.
8 These agreements were especially important for Southeast Asia because of the greater 
competitive pressure they faced as a result of China’s entry into WTO.  
China’s greatest success in regional multilateralism has been the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization, founded in 1995 as the ‘Shanghai Five’. This organisation, including China, 
Russia and the Central Asian republics, has progressively expanded its membership and agenda 
from narrow security concerns to comprehensive regional concerns. It has become the major 
Central Asian organisation, attracting the presidents of Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan to its 
meetings as well as the presidents of its member states. Considering the chaos that surrounds the 
diplomacy of newly established states in a poorly defined region, the establishment of a new 
regional organisation is a major accomplishment. 
Finally, since the late Cold War, China has viewed the global situation as one of multipolarity, 
in which no state can successfully dominate the rest and cooperation is necessary (Womack, 
2004a). The idea of multipolarity was used to criticise American unipolarity, but its premise was 
that no state could and should dominate the world, and thus successful foreign policy involves 
cooperation on the basis of mutual interest and respect. The related Chinese concepts of a 
‘democratic world order’ and a ‘harmonious world’ develop the idea implicit in multipolarity 
that international relations should be built on respecting all states as autonomous actors. The 
peacefulness of ‘China’s peaceful rise’ is therefore not simply a normative commitment. 
China’s successful rise has peace as a prerequisite. 
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3. Case  Studies 
How can the intentional behaviour of different actors be compared if they have different 
intentions and interpretations of norms? An action that seems a moral requirement for one actor 
may be morally repugnant to another. In 1840 for example, the British righteously upheld 
freedom of trade when they punished the Chinese for destroying British opium, while the 
Chinese were upholding their domestic law banning opium as well as destroying what they 
considered to be a dangerous and debilitating drug. If intentional actions are reduced to 
empirical behaviours, then the researcher’s moral judgment displaces the original intention. The 
question of normative action is thus reduced to how it measures up to the researcher’s own 
norms and interpretations.  
This dilemma notwithstanding, we can follow Immanuel Kant and look for categories defining 
normative action that transcend their specific content.
9 An example at the individual level would 
be sincerity, which regardless of one’s value system would be considered important for 
normative action. The structure of cases that Nathalie Tocci (2007) has proposed comes close to 
being an a priori array of defining categories that can be applied to any international normative 
actor regardless of content. 
Tocci’s four categories of action can be grouped into two polarities: normative and realist, and 
imperial and status quo. The first pair attributes different importance to the normative 
dimensions of action (normative in the case of the normative actor and non-normative in the 
case of the realist actor). The second pair is instead characterised by normative revisionism and 
unilateral intrusiveness at one end of the spectrum (the imperial actor) and conserving the 
existing situation (the status quo actor). These universal descriptive categories will be applied to 
a variety of actors. However, these polarities do not have to be disjunctive to be meaningful; 
they must only define a spectrum of possible actors and actions. The additional differentiation 
between ‘intended’ and ‘unintended’ policy impacts yields eight categories for which cases 
must be found. 
Since the four categories form the common framework of the research project and plausible 
Chinese cases can be cited for each category, this paper will abide by the framework. However, 
it should be noted that a linear four-category structure is logically demanding. It must exhaust 
the universe of relevant action and the categories must be either mutually exclusive or they must 
partly overlap only with their two neighbouring categories. In Figure 1 for example, point A can 
be ambiguous with respect to (N) and (R), but not to (I) and (SQ). The fact that a case study can 
be plausibly put in a particular category does not demonstrate the validity of the linear 
framework. It must be increasingly implausible to place it in a more remote category. 
 
Figure 1. The categories as linear 
  Normative (N)  Realist(R)  Imperial(I)  Status Quo(SQ) 
 
 A  B  C 
 
                                                      
9 What I have in mind here is Kant’s discussion of the a priori schemata of understanding in the Kritik der 
reinen Vernunft (Critique of Pure Reason) rather than the discussion of universal moral content in the 
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An alternative structure suggested by the presence of two polarity pairs is a two-dimensional 
array. In contrast to the linear array, this defines a space in which each case study must relate to 
both poles.  
Figure 2. The categories as complementary polarities 
 
   Normative    Realist 
 
 Imperial 
     A  
                 B   
          
      C  
 Status  Quo 
 
In this mapping, the previously ambiguous cases A (normative-realist) and C (imperial-status 
quo) must be able to be placed on the other dimension as well. Case study B (realist-imperial) 
would no longer be ambiguous, because it is now located at the intersection of the two axes 
rather than between two categories. If we assume that the polarities are dichotomous pairs, then 
the space can be a 2x2 table. The advantage of the two-dimensional mapping is that is raises 
interesting questions about the interrelationships between categories, but it has the disadvantage 
of reducing the number of cases and displacing the intended/unintended distinction into a 
separate analytical question. For the purposes of an initial attempt at comparison of normative 
actors, a variety of cases is an advantage. Therefore the linear approach is more appropriate as 
an exploratory schema.  
Tocci (2007) also suggests that all foreign policy actions can be analysed in terms of their goals, 
means, and impacts. While each of these categories has its empirical ambiguities in any concrete 
case (example: what was the goal of the American invasion of Iraq?), they are useful for 
discriminating between general approaches. In particular, the distinction between goals of 
possession and milieu goals provides a good first cut at normative versus self-serving purposes 
(Wolfers, 1962, pp. 67-80). Tocci (2007) suggests the enhancement of international law and 
institutions as a further criterion for normativity. Of course, this presumes the legitimacy and 
adequacy of international law and institutions, which may be problematic and also reflects 
international power politics. It should be recalled that Leopold II’s most brutal exploitation of 
the Congo was based on agreements signed (but not understood) by various chieftains, and then 
his private possession, the so-called ‘Congo Free State’ was ratified by European powers at the 
Berlin Conference in 1884-5, with no Africans present. Because of this, as Tocci rightly argues, 
both goals and means require critical evaluation in each case study. 
The conditioning factors raised by Tocci – domestic politics, domestic capabilities, and external 
environment – can also be reasonably expected to be present whatever the norms of the 
normative actor. The conditioning factors highlight the focus of the analysis on the normative 
actor’s individuality rather than on the relationship within which the action takes place – on the 
normative actor rather than the normative interactor. The state at the other end of the CHINA AS A NORMATIVE FOREIGN POLICY ACTOR | 9 
relationship is the object of action, a part of the external environment. We will return to the 
question of normative interaction within relationships in the third part of this working paper. 
Table 1. China’s Case Studies 
Normative Realpolitik  Imperial  Status  Quo 
Intended Unintended Intended Unintended Intended Unintended Intended    Unintended 
ASEAN 
1997- 
 
 
 
#1 
Tibet 
1950-55 
 
 
 
#2 
DPRK 
 
 
 
 
#3 
Khmer 
Rouge 
1977-90 
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3.1  Normative intended: China-ASEAN cooperation, 1997- 
China’s relationships with Southeast Asian states were chequered from 1964 to 1991. By 1991, 
China had normalised relations with all states in the region and established relations with the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). By holding the value of its currency steady 
during the 1997 Asian financial crisis, China contributed to regional stability, and China took 
the lead in proposing an ASEAN-China free trade area. In 2002 China added two important 
security dimensions to its relationship with ASEAN by becoming the first extra-regional state to 
accede to the region’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and agreeing to the peaceful settlement 
of disputes in the South China Sea (including the Spratly Islands, disputed by 5 claimants). Just 
as important as its direct assurances of non-aggression, China has not tried to establish exclusive 
security relations with the region.  
3.1.1  Goals, means and impact 
The goal of China’s ‘good neighbourhood policy’, of which better relations with ASEAN is an 
important part, is to stabilise China’s relationships with Asian neighbours and jointly pursue 
mutual benefit. These goals have been pursued by supporting, and seeking through negotiation, 
the peaceful expansion and intensification of multilateral organisations of sovereign members. 
Although a positive outcome requires sustained cooperative efforts on all sides, the results so far 
have been impressive. Both by China’s own normative standards and by the international law 
and institutions standards indicated by Tocci, China’s interaction with ASEAN over the past 
decade has been a tremendous success. On the one hand, China’s strategy of multipolarity and 
multilateralism have succeeded in bringing the ten countries of Southeast Asia and their 
regional association into a much closer relationship of mutual benefit. On the other hand, the 
creation of a free trade area, China’s accession to ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity, and the agreement 
on the peaceful settlement of disputes in the South China Sea, must be seen as milieu 
achievements in the region and as positive contributions to international law and institutions 
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3.1.2 Conditioning  factors 
Two principal factors explain China’s intended normative foreign policy towards ASEAN. On 
the one hand, the internal political context has been favourable, with the post-Deng leadership 
being unanimously supportive of a cooperative approach (Womack, 2004b), and public opinion 
not playing a noticeable role (either in favour or against). On the other hand, the external 
context and in particular the adroit and non-confrontational diplomacy of Southeast Asia was 
essential for success. Had Southeast Asia band-wagonned against China after Tiananmen, or 
split into pro-China and anti-China groupings, cooperation would have been impossible. A more 
distant contextual factor was that the presence of the US that gave Southeast Asia a latent option 
that might have influenced China to be gentler. However, against this interpretation it should be 
noted that China has not undercut relations between the US and Southeast Asia. Finally, it is 
interesting to note that while China had the capabilities to act cooperatively, it also disposed of 
the means for a more aggressive and self-serving policy towards Southeast Asia. It did not 
maximise its increasing bargaining power vis-à-vis its Southeast Asian neighbours. Encouraging 
multilateralism decreased its options for ‘divide and rule’. However, this policy has been a 
strategic success and one of mutual benefit, not one of self-sacrifice. 
3.2  Normative unintended: The peaceful liberation of Tibet, 1950-1955 
While few would doubt that China’s relations with ASEAN were normative, the incorporation 
of Tibet into China in the early 1950s may not seem an obvious choice for a normative action, 
albeit with an unintended outcome. From a Chinese perspective, the incorporation of Tibet was 
part of national liberation, not a matter of foreign policy. However, it did involve negotiation 
with an existing government, and there was an option of more forceful action. From a Western 
perspective instead, the subsequent events in Tibet have overshadowed earlier policies. 
Relations between China and the Dalai Lama’s government in Lhasa became increasingly tense 
from 1956, culminating in the March 1959 revolt and the Dalai Lama’s flight to India. Within 
Tibet, the leftist turn in China’s politics combined with the Dalai Lama’s breach of the 
Seventeen Point Agreement abruptly led to a particularly harsh regime in Tibet that lasted until 
1980. Since then there have been ongoing discussions regarding reconciliation, but so far they 
have not been successful (Womack, 2007). 
3.2.1  Goals, means and impact 
The goal of the peaceful liberation of Tibet is ambiguous, but normative considerations prevail. 
On the one hand, the incorporation of Tibet into the People’s Republic of China was a mission 
of establishing sovereign possession. In 1949 Tibet was not recognised as a sovereign state by 
any other state, although it had been autonomous for four decades. After the British invasion of 
1904 and the failure of the Qing dynasty to re-establish control, Tibet was left alone by the 
Republican government, although it maintained a symbolic presence and did not cede 
independence. On behalf of the People’s Republic of China, Mao Zedong then claimed all 
Chinese territory, including Taiwan and Tibet.
10 The control of Tibet was considered a strategic 
necessity because of its history of British involvement and the probability of future American 
involvement. On the other hand however, Mao’s commitment to inducing Tibet’s voluntary 
compliance might be seen as a normative milieu goal which presumed mutual benefit as the 
basis of policy. Mao was well aware that Tibet was ethnically and culturally distinct from the 
                                                      
10 Mongolia, which had declared independence in 1924 and had been admitted into the UN in 1961, 
remains contested by the Republic of China (hence the delay in its UN membership) but was recognised 
from 1949 on by the People’s Republic of China. CHINA AS A NORMATIVE FOREIGN POLICY ACTOR | 11 
rest of China, and that the ethnic Tibetan involvement in the Chinese revolution had come from 
outside Tibet proper.
11 For these reasons, Mao offered to the existing Tibetan government that it 
could keep its current structure, including its army, and that “in matters relating to the various 
reforms in Tibet, there would be no compulsion on the part of the central government”.
12 The 
sincerity of China’s normative motives – respect for the existing order in Tibet, unwillingness to 
force compliance unless the masses were behind it – is demonstrated by the negotiations and 
compromises that continued after the People’s Liberation Army was stationed and motor roads 
were built. Indeed, the Dalai Lama himself was deeply impressed by Mao’s sincerity during his 
year-long visit to Beijing and returned to Lhasa in March 1955 eager to participate in reforms 
and even asked to join the Communist Party of China. As Goldstein (2007, p. 547) puts it, 
“Mao’s improbable strategy of winning over the Dalai Lama had turned out to be an amazing 
success”. 
The means were also ambiguous, but overall China did not, up until 1955, use all the coercive 
means at its disposal. True, the presence of the People’s Liberation Army, though peaceful, left 
little doubt that even if Tibetans were not persuaded to cooperate, they would have no other 
option. However, as described by Melvyn Goldstein (2007) in his definitive history of the 
period, Mao Zedong chose to liberate Tibet peacefully, although he certainly had the military 
means to force an occupation. The Chinese leadership was respectful of existing institutions and 
leadership, and established its new relationship through unforced negotiation.  
However, China’s normative strategy vis-à-vis Tibet soon failed. Ethnic Tibetan areas outside 
Tibet began a drumroll of concerns about imposed reforms that culminated in the 1959 revolt, 
which unleashed pent-up radical interventions that reached a second crescendo in the Cultural 
Revolution. The internal norm of multicultural respect was lost, and the international norm of 
milieu improvements and international law suffered as well. The incompatibility between the 
interests of the Tibetan elite and the increasingly leftward direction of China’s politics thus led 
to the confrontation of 1959, and afterwards Tibet suffered the sudden collapse of its autonomy. 
3.2.2 Conditioning  factors 
Unlike the case of ASEAN, from the beginning there was a split in the CPC leadership between 
Mao’s policy of voluntary incorporation of Tibet and a more forceful unification. The difference 
was embodied by the rift between the two commanderies involved in the practical 
administration of Tibet policy: the Northwest Bureau and the Southwest Bureau. Eventually 
Mao personally removed Fan Ming, the aggressive leader in the Northwest Bureau and a more 
normative approach prevailed for a while. Yet latent divisions, coupled with domestic 
capabilities and the external environment led to ultimate failure. China certainly had the 
capacity to defeat Tibetan resistance, and there was no foreign power capable of effectively 
assisting Tibetan resistance. Moreover, there were many opportunities for the early termination 
of a peaceful reunification. This coupled with the external hostility towards China, especially 
from the US, raised the importance of Chinese strategic control of Tibet and suspicions of 
Tibetan autonomy. These security concerns increased after 1959, and anti-separatism became a 
justification for harsh Chinese policies. 
                                                      
11 Then as now, Tibet proper, the area controlled by the Dalai Lama from 1913 to 1959, contains only a 
part of the ethnic Tibetan population of China. The current Tibet Autonomous Region corresponds 
closely to original Tibet proper. 
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3.3  Realpolitik intended: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
China has been deeply involved in supporting the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
(North Korea) since its inception, sometimes at great cost to itself, but it has not controlled 
North Korea. Nevertheless, North Korea has served Chinese realpolitik purposes by acting as a 
buffer between China and American allies in the Cold War. When the Cold War ended, the 
utility of North Korea for China became less clear, but its collapse would pose serious 
uncertainties for China, and so support continues. China’s realpolitik policies have been 
sustained, but cannot be counted as a normative victory either by Chinese or by general 
international standards. 
3.3.1  Goals, means and impact 
The goal of China’s support of the DPRK has not been one of possession, but it has been the 
preservation of a buffer state regardless of the interests of its inhabitants. Tens of thousands of 
ethnic Koreans joined the People’s Liberation Army during its campaign in Northeast China, 
and afterwards many of these demobilised Koreans formed the backbone of the North Korean 
army (Chen, 1994). Despite this close link, the Korean War was clearly Kim Il Sung’s personal 
initiative, and China supported it only because the alternative would have been a hostile puppet 
state on the border of its major industrial base. By the late 1950s, Kim had removed all 
subordinates with ties to China, and yet North Korea’s utility as a buffer state remained until the 
end of the Cold War and China’s normalisation of relations with South Korea in 1992. The 
1990s were the coldest period in the China-North Korean relationship, but China continued to 
support a North Korean buffer state. Likewise, the nuclear crisis since 2002 has heightened 
tensions but has not changed the bottom line. However, the diplomatic opportunity of hosting 
the Six Party Talks has somewhat modified China’s framing of the North Korean problem, 
giving it a greater interest in resolution. In order to pursue the goal of a North Korean buffer 
state, China has used a mixture of state-to-state support, war in the 1950s, and international 
negotiations since 2002. The result, while being a realpolitik success, has not constituted much 
of a moral victory. Certainly the Six Party Talks can be considered positively from a normative 
perspective. However, North Korea’s missile test and nuclear explosion in 2006, against 
China’s public advice, constitute a clear non-normative result, which has once again chilled 
North Korean-Chinese relations.  
3.3.2 Conditioning  factors 
Internal interests coupled with limited capabilities and external constraints all explain China’s 
realpolitik policy towards North Korea and its intended effects. There is little disputing of the 
realpolitik logic in China’s North Korea policy. The areas bordering North Korea and the ethnic 
Koreans in China understand and support the policy. Furthermore there is little concern in China 
about North Korea’s nuclear or broader military capacity. Indeed alternative scenarios of either 
a desperate or a collapsed North Korea inhibit China’s alternative goals. It would be difficult to 
imagine a failed state in North Korea being more morally desirable, and American policy 
towards North Korea, while more self-righteous, has exacerbated and prolonged the crisis. 
Moving on to capabilities, China’s realistic options have been rather limited. It could not (and 
cannot) force more desirable behaviour without endangering its bottom line of a stable border. 
In turn, North Korea’s awareness of this has given it considerable leeway. Finally, the external 
environment explains both China’s realpolitik policies and its intended effects. North Korea is 
an especially interesting case for its external effects, because in 1989-92 the justifying 
environment of Chinese policy was transformed, but one bottom line (Cold War buffer) was 
soon replaced by another (danger of collapse) with the same effect (continuing support for CHINA AS A NORMATIVE FOREIGN POLICY ACTOR | 13 
North Korea). North Korea’s own objectives also play a role in explaining China’s intended 
effects. Just as China has needed a buffer state to secure its borders, North Korea has needed its 
last non-hostile ‘friend’, explaining the persistence of the relationship despite times of crisis.  
3.4  Realpolitik unintended: Khmer Rouge support 1977-1990 
It is sometimes mistakenly believed that China’s support for the Khmer Rouge was due to its 
affinity with the extreme policies in Cambodia. This is not the case (Richardson, 2005). Before 
the defeat of the American-supported Lon Nol regime in 1975, Sihanouk, the Soviet Union, 
China, and Vietnam all supported the Khmer Rouge because they were the most significant 
resistance force in Cambodia. From 1977 however, the Khmer Rouge became violently anti-
Vietnamese, and this fit China’s realpolitik purposes as the division between China and Vietnam 
became more hostile. Ironically, Chinese support of the Khmer Rouge increased as China’s own 
domestic policies shifted toward pragmatic reform after Mao’s death in September 1976. After 
Vietnam drove the Khmer Rouge out in December 1978, China continued to support the Khmer 
Rouge, again for realpolitik purposes: because they were the most determined anti-Vietnamese 
force (Chanda, 1986). Chinese support for the Khmer Rouge in the 1980s is quite comparable to 
American support for the Contras against Nicaragua at the same time. By 1990 Sihanouk’s 
efforts at negotiating a settlement of the Cambodian problem were beginning to bear fruit, and 
China shifted its support away from the Khmer Rouge and behind the UN-sponsored coalition 
government. Ironically, since 1991 China has been the most steadfast supporter of a Cambodian 
government largely derived from the pro-Vietnam government that the Khmer Rouge, supported 
by China at the time, was fighting. 
3.4.1  Goals, means and impact 
China claimed that it supported the Khmer Rouge because of Vietnam’s occupation of 
Cambodia, but it is clear that support began before the invasion, and that China was slow to 
respond to opportunities to end the occupation. China’s policy objectives were clearly 
realpolitik: the Khmer Rouge was an enemy of China’s enemy, and therefore a friend. The 
Chinese claim after 1979 that they were supporting the Khmer Rouge because of Vietnamese 
violations of Cambodian sovereignty was thus a figleaf for their anti-Vietnamese policies, 
although it was the same figleaf worn by the UN, the US, and ASEAN. In fact, China’s 
Cambodian policy was derivative of the Sino-Vietnamese hostility. Similarly, the means of 
supporting the Khmer Rouge as a force hostile to the Vietnamese occupation was founded 
neither on mutual benefit nor on the rule of law. The only bright spot in China’s Cambodian 
policy in the 1980s was its respect for Norodom Sihanouk, who managed to break the 
Cambodian stalemate through his individual efforts. The results were unintended. China’s 
diplomatic reputation was badly tarnished by its support of such a reprehensible group, even if it 
was not responsible for its crimes. Moreover, the attempt to contain and pressure Vietnam failed, 
and an unintended but more normative situation evolved in time. The failure of China’s support 
for the Khmer Rouge was thus the flip side of the ensuing emergence of regional peace.  
3.4.2 Conditioning  factors 
There were Chinese officials who were privately critical of increasing hostility towards Vietnam, 
and the Chinese who were in Cambodia with the Khmer Rouge were shocked by their policies. 
However, this was an area of great personal concern to Deng Xiaoping, and he was a forceful 
fellow. Hence China used all means at its disposal to support the Khmer Rouge, but it could not 
force Vietnam out of Cambodia. By 1989 many of the experts were convinced that a policy 
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environment was the most important factor explaining China’s policies and the unintended 
effects. First, shared hostility to Vietnam was the reason China supported the Khmer Rouge, and 
Vietnam’s alliance with the Soviet Union was the chief reason China opposed Vietnam. Second, 
in the 1980s common opposition to Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia strengthened China’s 
relations with the rest of Southeast Asia and the US. So there were indirect benefits to China’s 
position. Third and finally, due to shifts in Vietnam’s policy and Prince Sihanouk’s heroic 
diplomacy, the external environment ultimately shifted away from supporting stalemate. This 
isolated China, and eventually China also changed its policy. As its later successes in Southeast 
Asia demonstrated, a more moderate policy may have been more successful. 
3.5  Imperial intended: The Sino-Indian Conflict of 1962 
The Sino-Indian Border War of 1962 arose from the attempts of two anti-colonial states to 
enforce the conflicting claims of two historic empires. While the middle of the Himalayan 
frontier was buffered by the presence of Nepal and Bhutan, in the east and west the PRC 
enforced the boundaries of the Qing Empire, while India demanded the most forward claims of 
the British Empire. Until the late 1950s the border disputes were subordinated to a mutual 
commitment to friendly relations. The disputed territory was extraordinarily high and rugged, 
with little or no indigenous population and no obvious resources. However, alienation grew, in 
part as a result of the PLA’s suppression of the Tibetan revolt of March 1959 and the Dalai 
Lama’s subsequent refuge in India. The first armed border clash was in August 1959, and the 
decisive battles were fought between 10 October and 21 November 1962. Altitude and logistics 
made battle conditions harsh. The Indian army was routed, but the PLA stopped when it reached 
the edge of the disputed territory, and to this day China remains in control of the territory. At 
present, serious negotiations are in progress to trade India’s claim to the western territory (Aksai 
Chin) for China’s claim to most of the eastern territory.  
3.5.1  Goals, means and impact 
China had grounds to claim the territory on the basis of the Qing frontiers and India was 
provocative in its infiltration of the territories. This property dispute was of considerable value 
to China. Despite its emptiness and formidable altitude, the Aksai Chin is important to China 
because it provides the only land route between Tibet and western Xinjiang (Kashgar). Yet the 
means employed to pursue this goal – use of force – did not further international peace or 
mutual benefit, even if China should be given credit for restricting the war to the territory under 
dispute. With regards to the outcome, the war was a success for China, but at the cost of its 
relationship with India. China’s victory settled the possession of the territory and redefined the 
terms of future negotiations. Yet the war was the main event confirming India’s profound 
alienation, suspicion and fear of China. Furthermore, China was universally blamed for the war 
at the time, though judgements have become more complex since (Maxwell, 1970) and India 
improved its relationships with both the US and the Soviet Union as a result. 
3.5.2 Conditioning  factors 
China pursued war against India as a matter of prime strategic importance. It was a central 
policy without domestic opposition. While having the capabilities to pursue its goals through 
military means, alternative strategies were improbable. Given the nationalism and self-
righteousness of both sides leading to the armed conflict, it is hard to imagine a negotiated 
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3.6  Imperial unintended: Hostilities with Vietnam, 1977-1990 
China’s hostility towards Vietnam after the American war in Vietnam resulted from an 
increasingly hostile series of interactions with Vietnam, but it can be considered unilateral. Both 
China and Vietnam had illusions of victory after 1975. Vietnam thought that it would retain 
world attention and support, and China thought that it had gained a grateful younger brother 
(Womack, 2003b). As Vietnam asserted independence vis-à-vis China and continued its 
relationship with the Soviet Union, China increased pressure on Vietnam and aid to the Khmer 
Rouge. Vietnam (rightly) perceived the China-Cambodian alliance as a national security threat, 
and invaded Cambodia in December 1978. Deng Xiaoping responded by invading and 
occupying five of Vietnam’s six border provinces. The border war of January-February 1979 
was a limited incursion like the border war with India, but it was intended to be a ‘lesson’ to 
Vietnam, so the action was one of domination rather than coercive border delimitation. On the 
day that Lang Son, the last of the provincial capitals, was captured, the withdrawal began. A 
‘second lesson’ was threatened up until 1985, sporadic hostilities continued on the border until 
1986, and normal relations were not restored until December 1991, after Sihanouk returned to 
Cambodia at the head of a UN-sponsored coalition government.  
3.6.1  Goals, means and impact 
Although Vietnam’s behaviour was also at fault, the primary reason for China’s hostility was its 
perception of a Soviet-Vietnamese alliance. Even the invasion of Cambodia was secondary, 
although it provided the trigger for hostilities. The case for the action being normative is 
somewhat weaker, since China was trying to push Vietnam into being a deferential neighbour. 
But had it succeeded, perhaps Southeast Asia would have been permanently split into a socialist 
camp of China’s protégés and a weak ASEAN supported by the US. The means that China used 
were diverse. Most obviously, limited war was used in 1979, but this was followed by 
collaboration with ASEAN and the US against Vietnam, and by successful efforts to seat the 
Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea at the UN, which included the Khmer Rouge 
as a veto-wielding member and major armed force. Although the result was unintended, the case 
could be made that it had positive normative consequences. The persistence of Chinese hostility 
was certainly a factor in Vietnam’s decision to unilaterally withdraw from Cambodia in 1989. 
This opened the way for a multilateral, UN-brokered solution to the Cambodia problem, 
certainly a positive milieu change. The conflict however could not be considered a success by 
either side. Vietnam was not forced to submit, and yet its economic development required 
normalisation of relations with its neighbours, first and foremost China. 
3.6.2 Conditioning  factors 
Although there are no empirical indicators of Chinese public opinion in 1978, which was in any 
case focused on domestic issues, Vietnam’s provocations excited public anger. Vietnam had 
forced 140,000 ethnic Chinese residents over the border into China in 1978, leading to Chinese 
public support in favour of China’s limited war. China could have waged a larger war in 
Vietnam, but the consequences for both countries would probably have been disastrous. Even 
the limited conflict was deadly, with 20,000 casualties estimated for each side. However, it is 
incorrect to say that Vietnam stopped the Chinese advance given that from the beginning it was 
a limited action. The results of the war are largely explained by the external environment. From 
1976 to 1979 there was negative complementarity in the interaction between China and Vietnam 
that made conflict unavoidable, and from 1979 to 1986, China, the US, and ASEAN cooperated 
against Vietnam and in order to create a stalemate on Cambodia. A low point in this cooperation 
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headed by Sihanouk but which included the Khmer Rouge as a veto-holding member and as the 
main fighting force. From 1986 to 1989 Sihanouk’s efforts at personal diplomacy broke the 
stalemate and created conditions for a solution. 
3.7  Status Quo success: Cambodia, 1991- 
China’s began to cut its support for the Khmer Rouge in 1990, and did not use its leverage on 
their behalf during the May 1993 elections of the United Nations Transitional Authority 
(UNTAC). After the elections, China supported the uneasy compromise between the chief vote-
winner, Prince Ranariddth, and Hun Sen, the leader installed by the Vietnamese who was 
actually in control of government machinery. The uneasiness of the compromise is indicated in 
their respective titles of First and Second Prime Minister. Thereafter, China quickly became a 
major donor to development projects. When Hun Sen deposed Prince Ranariddh in 1997 he was 
widely criticised even within ASEAN and some non-Chinese aid projects were suspended. 
China however pursued a status quo policy, continuing aid flows. In 2002 Premier Zhu Rongji 
visited Phnom Penh and announced the cancellation of all debts owed to China by Cambodia.  
3.7.1  Goals, means and impact 
China’s support for the UNTAC in Cambodia in 1991-93, followed by support for the Kingdom 
of Cambodia since 1993, has been an impressive application of its policy of non-interference in 
domestic affairs and respect for existing governments. China decided to recognise the new 
status quo in Cambodia and more generally in Southeast Asia. The means used in this policy 
shift were normative, first supporting the efforts of the UN and Sihanouk to rearrange the 
context of Cambodian politics, and then backing the government actively but not intrusively. 
China’s status quo policies in Cambodia had their intended effects. China did not try to 
influence the factional infighting in the 1990s, and the government has matured since then. 
Unlike North Korea, Myanmar, Sudan, and Zimbabwe, where China has begun to reconsider 
uncritical support of current regimes, Cambodia is probably better off for China’s uncritical 
support. Moreover, what Cambodia has most lacked from the fall of Sihanouk in 1970 to the 
present is international respect for its autonomy. American bombs, Chinese support for the 
Khmer Rouge, and the UN’s money monsoon were all profound distractions from the internal 
learning experience of a political community. No country can create that experience for another 
country, but at least China (finally) gave Cambodia some space.  
3.7.2 Conditioning  factors 
China’s policy shift in favour of a status quo approach in Cambodia was largely driven by the 
external environment. By 1990 China’s support for the Khmer Rouge had no future. More 
importantly, the stalemate surrounding Cambodia was breaking up, and China ran the risk of 
being isolated in its intransigence. Hence, the policy shift, which was widely approved within 
China, with no strong interests pushing in favour of a more activist normative approach. 
Cambodia is not an issue for most Chinese. China could have tried to influence the factions in 
Cambodia, continuing to oppose the remnants of the government installed by the Vietnamese 
and cooperating with other external forces for this. But Chinese foreign policy means instead 
focused on consolidating the new status quo. After UNTAC, China’s relationship with the 
Kingdom of Cambodia has been rather indifferent to external environment. Western donors 
have criticised China’s policies towards Cambodia, swinging from (unfounded) suspicions of 
China’s continuing covert support for the Khmer Rouge to complaints of too few strings 
attached to Chinese aid programmes. Furthermore, international donors in Cambodia feel that 
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affected China’s policy approach. Given the needs of Cambodia and the ignorance and 
arrogance of some donors, the steadfastness of China’s support is appreciated (Richardson, 
2005). 
3.8  Status quo failure: Myanmar 1988-2007 
China is known for its uncritical support of the Myanmar military junta after they suppressed 
demonstrations in 1988, overturned the 1990 elections and placed Aung San Suu Kyi under 
house arrest. China has not been alone in its support of Myanmar. Myanmar was admitted into 
ASEAN in 1997, and India and Japan have been involved in aid and development. But China 
has been Myanmar’s major external partner since 1988. China’s uncritical support for the status 
quo in Myanmar began to waver in May 2003 when Aung San Suu Kyi was briefly released 
from house arrest and then imprisoned after being attacked by a mob. Since then China’s public 
media has included external criticisms by other states in its coverage of Myanmar. Nevertheless, 
in January 2007 China and Russia vetoed a draft UN resolution sponsored by the US calling for 
various reforms including the release of political prisoners. South Africa also voted against the 
resolution although its position was more explicitly critical of Myanmar’s domestic politics and 
it agreed that the issue should be dealt with by the UN Human Rights Council.
13 Yet regardless 
of the outcome in Myanmar and despite the fact that China has not been alone in pursuing status 
quo policies, its policy of uncritical support for the regime has been a failure. If the 
demonstrations succeed in transforming the government, it is likely to be more pro-Western and 
more distant from China. If the regime again suppresses the demonstrators, then China will have 
to reconsider its policy of support towards it.  
3.8.1  Goals, means and impact  
Contrary to the opinions of many outside observers, China’s uncritical support of the Burmese 
government was not aimed at seizing the opportunity of fishing in troubled waters, but was 
rather an application of its general policy of non-interference in domestic affairs. Burma was a 
sensitive case for this policy approach because in the recent past China had in fact interfered in 
Burma. But the new policies applied to Burma did not differ from those applied, for example, to 
Mongolia, whose post-communist government quickly found many other friends abroad. When 
China continued its relationship with the Myanmar government despite the demonstrations and 
elections of 1988, it did so according to its policy of non-interference in domestic affairs. Its 
policy of non-interference was bolstered further by Chinese awareness that the status quo in 
Myanmar does not threaten regional or international stability. In this respect the statement by 
Wang Guangya, China’s ambassador to the UN in January 2007 is revealing: “the present 
domestic situation in Myanmar does not pose a threat to international or regional peace and 
security”, he stressed, adding that “similar problems exist in many other countries as well”.
14  
The means of China’s support have been the normal contacts of neighbouring states, but 
distorted in their salience by Burma’s isolation from global powers. Back in 1988, at the same 
time as the demonstrations, the United Wa State Army disbanded the Burmese Communist 
Party and exiled its leaders to China. China did not support the exiles, nor did it use its own 
large population of ethnic Wa to destabilise the Wa leaders. The United Wa State Army soon 
reached a compromise with Myanmar’s military government and remains in charge of part of 
the border with China. Moreover, the Wa have been a leading producer of opium and supplier 
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of opium to China. If the Wa state were Pancho Villa and China were the US, a Chinese General 
Pershing would have crossed the border and more interventionist policies would have been 
pursued. As it is, China has only used economic incentives to encourage alternative crops, and 
the Wa area has recently been declared opium-free by the UN (Fuller, 2007).  
Nevertheless, China appears to be gradually appreciating the unsustainability of its status quo 
policies. Especially in the past year, China has supplemented its normal state-to-state relations 
with attempts to encourage the Burmese government to manage its political crisis. In June 2007, 
China hosted the first meeting between officials of the US and Myanmar since 2003, and US 
criticisms of the regime were published in People’s Daily.
15 Most notably, State Counsellor 
Tang Jiaxuan told the special envoy of Myanmar’s Head of State at a meeting in China’s 
official offices in Beijing that “China whole-heartedly hopes that Myanmar will push forward a 
democracy process that is appropriate for the country”. He then said to U Nyan Win, Myanmar 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, that the democracy process was in the fundamental interests of the 
people of Myanmar and conducive to regional peace, stability and development.
16 Nevertheless, 
public reporting on the September demonstrations has been extremely low-key in China and 
undoubtedly China is waiting for the outcome before it responds. The loosening of China’s 
status quo attitude toward Myanmar shows both a recognition of the increasing difficulties of its 
status quo policy and a growing sophistication in its appraisal of the interactions between 
domestic conditions and international relations. China is hardly likely to be converted to a 
missionary zeal for human rights, but has become more sensitive to the issues. Only time will 
tell if the current turmoil in Myanmar will end in a positive transformation of the government or 
yet another crackdown by the military, but China is no longer indifferent to the outcome. 
3.8.2 Conditioning  factors 
The main driving force for China’s cautionary status quo policies towards Myanmar is the 
domestic complication that much of what happens on the border between Myanmar and Yunnan 
is not under the control of the central government. Clearly China has the capacity to join in 
sanctions against Myanmar, but it is less clear that such sanctions would be effective. 
Considering South Africa’s experience with sanctions under apartheid, its stance is perhaps 
instructive. However, the unwillingness of the Myanmar junta to do anything but make empty 
promises and drift further into a conservative dead end is probably the chief reason for the 
recent and tentative shift in China’s policy, abandoning a clear cut status quo policy. Regional 
and global pressures were probably less significant. 
4.  General Lessons from China as a Normative Foreign Policy Actor 
Can these cases be mapped? 
Table 1 again. China’s Case studies 
Normative Realpolitik  Imperial  Status  Quo 
Intended Not  Intended Not  Intended Not  Intended    Not 
                                                      
15 People’s Daily Online, June 27, 2007. 
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Just as an experiment, I have tried to map my eight cases into a polarity-based space. It was not 
easy. A major problem was with the unintended outcome cases – should the intention be 
mapped, or the outcome? The most obvious example is Tibet. Perhaps this problem illustrates 
the difficulty of combining outcomes with intentional action on the same schemata. Perhaps it 
illustrates an inherent flaw with the polarity idea. I await the thoughts and cases of others.  
Fitting China’s actions into an a priori schemata does not exhaust its potential contributions to a 
general theory of normative international action. I would like to describe four lessons, of two 
different kinds. The serious consideration of China as an intentional actor demands from 
Americans and Europeans a stretching of ideas about normative action beyond the common 
sense of the West. The first two lessons are lessons drawn from the difference, or more precisely, 
lessons from the experience that difference is not simply a measure of defectiveness. These 
lessons are first, that perspective matters, and second, that asymmetry of power matters. The 
second two lessons are substantive lessons deriving from the rationality of China’s normative 
behaviour. They are first, that relationships matter, and second, that respect for the other can be 
considered as the cardinal virtue in normative international action. Of course, I do not mean to 
stake a claim that these lessons are China’s (or my) exclusive intellectual property. Implicit in 
the claim of generality is that they can be found elsewhere as well. 
The first lesson is that perspective matters. If we assume that international interaction is merely 
a phenomenon of behavioural events, and the purpose of norms is to sort these events into 
normal and abnormal, good and bad, then the question of perspective does not arise. But 
perspective lurks in the background, because the standpoint of the judge has been ‘absolutised’. 
If we are to treat the producers of events as intentional actors, then we must unbundle the 
behaviour from our judgement of it, and consider it as their actions, with their intentions. 
All actors, international or individual, are located actors. They move within a framework of 
possible actions that is given meaning by their history, their resources, and their judgement of 
those with whom they are interacting. It would be naïve historicism to think that actions are 20 | BRANTLY WOMACK 
determined by situation. However, the salience of a decision, its meaning as an intentional act, 
is determined by location in the broadest sense. For example, one might tolerate class 
distinctions and differences of treatment between tourist and business classes in an airplane, but 
not in a lifeboat. China has been closer to the lifeboat situation for most of the twentieth century, 
and thus it is not surprising that concerns of equity have prevailed over those of property. The 
history of a political community provides its shared images of alternatives and their 
consequences, and the history of each community is different. Resources set the horizons of the 
feasible, and the shortage of vital resources can define the urgency of interests. To the extent 
that action is interaction, expectations regarding the behaviour of the other become an essential 
part of one’s own intentionality, and the pattern of interaction may determine a path of least 
resistance for the next act. 
The second general lesson is the reality of the asymmetry of international power. China is an 
interesting case for asymmetry because it was on the ‘big end’ of asymmetric relationships for 
most of its history, then on the small end for the first hundred years of its modern era, and now 
is re-emerging as a major power. The lessons of China’s asymmetry – which can be found 
elsewhere as well – are that differences in capacity have a profound effect on relationships, but 
that the larger side is rarely able to enforce its will unilaterally on the smaller side. The 
assumption in international relations theory that only the relations of great powers are of interest, 
and that the weak are simply dominated, is a pernicious error of remarkable hardiness. In fact, 
most international relationships are asymmetric, and usually they are negotiated rather than 
forced. 
Even in a normal asymmetric relationship, however, the difference in capacity profoundly 
affects the perspectives of each side.
17 The larger side risks less in the relationship, and thus 
tends to be less attentive. When a crisis arises, it is inclined to use its power to push the weaker 
into line. The smaller side is proportionally more exposed in the relationship. Both the 
opportunities and the risks are more vivid. In a crisis it tends to see the bullying of the larger 
side as an existential threat. In a more complex regional or global environment there are 
intermediate powers that are larger than many but smaller than one or a few great powers. It is 
not surprising that intermediate powers are the strongest supporters of multilateral legal regimes, 
because they are powerful enough to be part of the ‘establishment’ but vulnerable enough to 
want great powers to be bound by rules.
18  
The third general lesson is more specific to China. In both domestic and international 
interactions, Chinese tend to emphasise the logic of relationships rather than the logic of 
transactions. The logic of relationships is longitudinal. It assumes that while the future is 
unknown, the partners in the future are the same as in the past and present. Therefore the 
significance of any specific interaction lies in how it shapes a particular relationship. The polar 
opposite of relationship logic is transactional logic, epitomised by microeconomics. In 
microeconomics each transaction is an event in itself, determined by supply and demand, and 
occurring between anonymous bargainers in infinite numbers.  
As China applies relationship logic to international relations, its actions aim to optimise 
relationships rather than transactions. In this model China does not use preponderance of power 
to optimise its side of each transaction, but rather to stabilise beneficial relations. For instance, 
tribute missions to Beijing usually left with more valuable goods than they brought, because it 
was more important to China to have them want to participate in the Empire than it was to 
squeeze a bit more out of the transaction. Similarly, as a central power (or an aspiring central 
                                                      
17 The general idea of asymmetry is elaborated in Womack (2006, chapter 4). 
18 This argument is developed further in Brantly Womack (2004c). CHINA AS A NORMATIVE FOREIGN POLICY ACTOR | 21 
power), China’s preferred mode of interaction is unilateral accommodation of the perceived 
needs of the other side rather than bargaining. China’s recent forgiveness of the debts owed by 
Laos and Cambodia fit this pattern. Note that this is not altruism. China’s gains are deferential 
and trouble-free relationships. 
For the last lesson, China is both a ‘teacher by negative example’ and a positive example. If all 
international action is interaction, then a cardinal virtue of international relations should be 
respect for the partner. This is a fundamentally different attitude from that of the modern West, 
which has tended to use the carpenter’s rule of its own norms to level and if necessary 
pressurise others into uniformity. Consider the American occupation of Iraq; a magnificent 
commitment to democratise Iraq down to the last Iraqi. Are not all human beings entitled to 
their own autonomy as well as to their rights? Can people be forced to be empowered? 
China’s negative example of respect is more oblique. Traditional China strove for normal 
asymmetric relationships with its neighbours, which meant relationships that were beneficial to 
the neighbours as well as to China. China provided a non-intrusive regional order, and in it the 
neighbours were assured that the central power acknowledged their autonomy. Vietnam, for 
instance, was much happier and more secure occasionally going to Beijing than later having 
Paris come to it. This is why Vietnam requested China’s help against the French in the 1880s. 
However, China’s claim to infinite moral and civilisational superiority was intolerable, and led 
to the hypocrisy of deference in Beijing and surreptitious defiance at home. China’s positive 
example of respect can be seen in its diplomacy of the past ten years. China’s improved 
relations with its neighbours and with Africa are the result of an intense and skilful diplomacy 
of respect. To countries that normally do not get much respect, China lavishes attention on the 
leadership, assures that it will not publicly murmur about domestic politics, much less intervene, 
and it shows understanding for the vulnerabilities of local economies. China is not only non-
threatening, it is reassuring. Perhaps as China becomes more powerful it will become more 
arrogant and hence less respectful. However, as long as it values relationships, respect, whether 
direct or oblique, will remain a cardinal virtue. 
All these general lessons are interrelated. If international actors are located actors and have their 
own perspectives, and if they are located in a matrix of unequal interrelationships, then their 
individual perspectives will generate sets of particular relationships. After all, geography, 
demography, and resources imply that, whatever happens in the world, each state will deal 
primarily with a particular set of other states, and will tend to stay on the larger or smaller side 
of these relationships. To return to my familiar example, China and Vietnam have been through 
many changes over the past three thousand years, but there has always been a relationship, and 
it has always been an asymmetric one in China’s favour. 
If international relations are essentially a matrix of international relationships, then the logic of 
relationships should play a larger part in the guidance of foreign policy. The ‘should’ indicates 
that relationship logic ought to be a normative requirement, but it is not a universalistic or 
altruistic one. The bottom line in relationship logic is that both sides feel that they are better off 
if the relationship continues – this is the minimum meaning of ‘mutual benefit’. A normal 
relationship does not require symmetry of partners or equality of exchanges, but it does require 
reciprocity. 
In an asymmetric world, reciprocity requires respect. In a world of equals, each is in a similar 
situation, and each can respond in kind to the actions of others. With symmetry, respect for 
others can be reduced to the Golden Rule, because in fact others can do to you what you do to 
them. In a world of asymmetric relationships, respect – appreciation for the situation and 
autonomy of the other – requires special attention. Respect for the weaker side is not simply 22 | BRANTLY WOMACK 
noblesse oblige or an act of generosity of the stronger. The weak can only afford to be 
deferential to the strong when it feels that its identity and boundaries will be respected.  
China was the world’s most successful traditional empire not because it had the strongest army, 
but because its skilful management of its asymmetric relationships gave a resilience to its 
domestic and external order. In a world that is integrated and multi-nodal, one that is beyond the 
fixation with great powers and world wars, China’s experience should be useful. Moreover, in 
the past decade there is no country that has made more friends than China, and this is by no 
means a natural fate for a rising power. China has much to learn and much adapting to do, but it 
also has lessons for the rest of us. | 23 
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